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Abstract
This paper provides an introduction to the evaluation of alterna-
tive time streams of consumption and the closely related concept of
time preference. The potential sensitivity of comparisons, especially
to the choice of time preference rate and elasticity of marginal valu-
ation, is demonstrated. The nature of time preference, based on an
axiomatic approach, is then discussed. The analysis of optimisation
over time leads to the concept of the social time preference rate, and a
diﬃculty with using this rate is highlighted. Finally, complications in-
troduced by non-income diﬀerences between individuals are examined.
Emphasis is placed on the central role of value judgements.
∗We are grateful to Tony Scott and Denis O’Brien for comments on an earlier version
of this paper.
11 Introduction
This paper provides an introduction to the evaluation of alternative time
streams and the closely related concept of time preference. Many investment
projects involve a present cost incurred in order to achieve future beneﬁts.
These might be in the context of investments in health technology, civil en-
gineering projects, or environmental protection. It is therefore necessary to
evaluate alternative outcomes, involving diﬀerent time streams of net bene-
ﬁts. In any exercise of this kind there are obviously huge problems associated
with measurement issues and uncertainty about the future. But the aim of
the present paper is to discuss a central issue in the evaluation of alternative
time streams — that of discounting. Despite the long-standing nature of thie
problem, it remains controversial and even the basic issues are far from being
settled.1 One of the problems concerns a lack of clarity over the concepts.
Another problem arises from the fact that there is no escape from fundamen-
tal value judgements, while protagonists on diﬀerent sides of debates often
conceal their value judgements. The role of the professional economist in
these situations is to examine the implications of adopting alternative value
judgements. Hence it is important to be clear about precisely how they enter
the calculations and how they may be speciﬁed.
Section 2 begins by introducing the concept of the social welfare func-
tion that is dominant in the literature concerned with evaluating alternative
consumption or income streams. This form of welfare function involves, as
well as attaching diﬀerent weights to diﬀerent levels of consumption irrespec-
tive of their timing, the discounting of future ﬂows using what is called a
‘ p u r et i m ep r e f e r e n c er a t e ’ . T h e r ea r ea l t e r n a t i v ev i e w sa b o u tt h ew a yt o
proceed. One approach is simply to say that the social welfare function is
meant to represent alternative value judgements and therefore results should
be reported for alternative time preference rates. Some economists attempt
to impose their own value judgements, using rhetorical arguments suggesting
for example that pure time preference is in some sense ‘ethically indefensible’.
1For example, the controversial nature of discounting is demonstrated by the debate
over the so-called Stern Report (2006) on climate change.
2However, it is desirable to have a clear understanding not only of what is im-
plied by pure time preference — or its absence — but what value judgements
may lie behind it. That is, it is useful to appreciate how time preference
can arise from more basic axioms stating speciﬁc value judgements in a clear
way. Section 3 provides an explanation of an axiomatic approach to time
preference, following the argument of Koopmans (1960).
Section 4 turns from social evaluations of exogenous time proﬁles to de-
cisions regarding the socially optimal allocation over time. It therefore con-
cerns the planning, again by an independent judge, of optimal saving and
consumption patterns but uses the same kind of social welfare function. Sec-
tion 5 returns to the evaluation of alternative streams in the context of cost-
beneﬁt analyses. It discusses the concept of the social time preference rate
and highlights a problem with its application. Section 6 introduces some
modiﬁcations to the basic form of social welfare function discussed in earlier
sections.
2 Social Evaluations
Suppose it is required to evaluate a time stream C =[ c1,c 2,...] of consump-
tion. For simplicity, it is assumed that the population consists only of individ-
uals (rather than families), that the size of the population remains unchanged
over time, and that consumption is the only economic variable considered to
be relevant by the judge.2 The term ct refers to aggregate consumption in
period t. Hence there is, by assumption, no concern for within-period in-
equality among individuals. An evaluation cannot avoid the use of value
judgements. Hence, the usual approach is to examine the implications of
adopting a range of value judgements.
2These assumptions are relaxed in section 6 below.
32.1 A Social Welfare Function
Consider social evaluations based on an additive Paretian social welfare func-










where U (ct) is the weight attached by the judge to period t’s consumption. It
is a cardinal measure of the contribution to W, before discounting, of period
t’s consumption. The term ρ i st h er a t eo fp u r et i m ep r e f e r e n c e—t h ef o c u s
of attention in much of the discussion below.
The weighting function U is often called a utility function, although this
is somewhat misleading unless it refers to a single-person framework. Hence
the time preference rate is sometimes also called a ‘utility discount rate’.
The social welfare function W does not in general represent the wellbeing
of society. Above all, it does not represent ‘society’s views’, although it is
remarkable how often writers slip into the use of such expressions.
Figure 1: Present Values and Discounting
The eﬀects of discounting alone can be seen in Figure 1, which shows










































































Figure 3: Sensitivity to Choice of Epsilon (Greater Than 1):
5Consideration of alternative value judgements regarding U is facilitated







The term ε measures the degree of constant relative aversion to variability
o nt h ep a r to ft h ej u d g e .T h o s ew h or e f e rt oU as a utility function typically
refer to ε as the constant (absolute value of the) elasticity of marginal utility.
However, the term ‘elasticity of marginal valuation’ would be clearer.
Alternative value judgements — within the context of this class of welfare
functions — can be examined by investigating W f o rar a n g eo fv a l u e so fε and
ρ.T h ev a l u e so fW (C) are highly sensitive to the choice of ε,a ss h o w ni n
Figures 2 and 3, where each proﬁle shows the variation in the present value
of a time stream as ρ is increased, for a given value of ε. These show the
value of W (C) for a consumption stream over 250 periods, where the initial
value is 30 units and there is smooth growth at the constant rate of 2.3 per
cent per period. Figure 2 shows the reduction in the present value as ε is
increased from 0.2 to 0.6, w h i l eF i g u r e3s h o w sv a r i a t i o n sf o rv a l u e so fε>1,
for which W (C) is negative.
Illustrative examples of social indiﬀerence curves for consumption in pe-
riods 1 and 2, based on (1) combined with (2), are shown in Figure 4. In







(1 + ρ) (3)
At the point of intersection with the 45 degree line from the origin, along
which consumption is equal in both periods, the solid indiﬀerence curve
shown is steeper than the downward sloping 45 degree line, indicating pure
time preference. The elasticity, reﬂecting the concavity of U,i sa l s oam e a -
sure of the convexity of indiﬀerence curves, so that the solid curve reﬂects a
lower value than the broken curve.
The introduction of the terms ρ and ε in the social welfare function makes
it clear that these reﬂect the value judgements of a hypothetical judge or de-













Figure 4: Time Preference
using a variety of methods, which (their authors argue) should then be used
in evaluations. Estimation methods include questionnaires, the analysis of
cross-sectional consumption patterns and saving behaviour for various pop-
ulation groups, and the recovery of implicit value judgements involved in
previous tax and transfer policies. However, there is no escape from the fact
that value judgements are involved: the economist can only compare the
results of imposing alternative values.3
2.2 Comparing Alternative Time Streams
In view of the sensitivity of present values to the choice of ε and ρ it cannot
be expected that alternative time proﬁles, or projects, have the same rank-
ing, independent of the choice of elasticity of marginal valuation and time
preference rate. Consider the two proﬁles A and B in Figure 5, where B has
the fastest constant growth rate of 1.6 per cent, compared with A of 0.9 per
c e n t ,b u tt h es t a r t i n gv a l u eo fBi s5w h i l et h a to fAi s1 5 . T i m ep r o ﬁle
3For discussion of various ‘estimation’ methods and criticism of their use in social















Figure 5: Alternative Time Proﬁles of Consumption
B is expected to dominate A only for relatively low values of ρ, though the
particular value of ρ for which the ranking changes depends crucially on the
choice of ε. Present values are shown in Figure 6 for ε =0 .6. For values of
ε>0.88, there is no change in the ranking of the two proﬁles as ρ varies.
More complex comparisons may result from more variable time proﬁles,
making the choice of alternative streams more sensitive to the choices of
ε and ρ. Consider Figure 7, where time stream A results from a constant
growth rate of 2.3 per cent (starting from 10 units), but proﬁle B results from
a ﬁxed trend rate of growth of 1.8 per cent (starting from 4 units) combined
with a cyclical growth component having an amplitude of 5 per cent and a
wavelength of 165 periods. From the multiple intersections, it is likely that
stream A has the highest value of W (C) for both low and high values of
ρ, while stream B is likely to dominate for intermediate values, though the
precise values are again likely to be sensitive to the choice of ε.E x a m p l e sa r e
given in Figures 8 and 9, for two diﬀerent values of the elasticity of marginal
valuation, ε.
It is important to recognise that (1) represents a particular set of value















B: epsilon = 0.6
A: epsilon = 0.6





























Figure 7: Alternative Time Proﬁles
9A: epsilon = 0.2
B: epsilon = 0.2














A: epsilon = 0.2
B: epsilon = 0.2















Figure 8: Rankings for Epsilon = 0.2




























A: epsilon = 0.6
B: epsilon = 0.6
Rho
Figure 9: Rankings for Epsilon = 0.6
10tion function is additive and Paretian. Alternative views about the desirable
evaluation of a time stream of consumption are obviously possible, and pro-
fessional economists cannot make prescriptions about the form to be used,
but can only investigate the implications of adopting alternative forms. The
following section considers the implications of the absence of time preference
and examines a set of fundamental value judgements, in the form of axioms,
giving rise to positive time preference.
3 Existence of Time Preference
The question considered here is whether time preference arises from a clear
set of axioms describing an independent judge’s or social planner’s views
(value judgements) about time proﬁles of consumption. This makes it easier
to identify precisely why individuals may diﬀer in their attitudes towards
time preference. The following discussion is a highly simpliﬁed version of the
argument put forward by Koopmans (1960).4
3.1 An Axiomatic Approach
Consider an independent judge with an ordinal evaluation function, given
by P(C)=P (c1,c 2,c 3,...) and deﬁned over a time stream of consumption
represented by the vector, C =[ c1,c 2,c 3,...]. It is simply assumed that this
function has the usual properties of evaluation functions, such as monotonic-
ity and transitivity. For simplicity, it is assumed that the population consists
only of individuals (rather than families), that the size of the population
remains unchanged over time, and that consumption is the only economic
variable considered to be relevant by the judge. The term ct refers to aggre-
gate consumption in period t. Hence there is, by assumption, no concern for
4Other demonstrations are available. Marina and Scaramozzino (1999, p.6) provided an
interesting analysis of growth in an overlapping generations framework. They stated that,
‘a social rate of pure time preference is justiﬁable on purely ethical grounds’. A clearer
statement of what the authors showed is that if the objective of maximising average
steady-state consumption per capita is adopted, then an implication of this ethical value
judgement, combined with a model containing productivity and population growth, is that
positive time preference exists that does not reﬂect myopia.
11within-period inequality among individuals.
Stated informally, the continuity axiom states that any slight variation
in C d o e sn o tl e a dt ob i gc h a n g e si nt h ev a l u a t i o no fC, while a boundedness
axiom states that paths CA and CB exist such that P(CA) ≤ P(C) ≤ P(CB).
If alternative paths were to produce unbounded values of P,t h e yc o u l dn o t
be ranked.5
The sensitivity a x i o ms a y st h a ti fp a t h sC0 and C1 diﬀer in only the ﬁrst
period, then P(C0) 6= P(C1). Essentially this is stating that the ﬁrst period
matters, in that it cannot be swamped by all other periods. Without the
sensitivity axiom, a small gain to each of an inﬁnitely large number of future
periods, achieved at the expense of reducing consumption in the present
period to zero, would be regarded as acceptable.
A non complementarity (or independence) axiom states that if two time
streams diﬀer only by the ﬁrst period, their ranking does not depend on
t h ef o r mo ft h er e m a i n i n gs t r e a m . H e r e ,i ti sc o n v e n i e n tt oi n t r o d u c et h e
notation C[2] =( c2,c 3,c 4,...), so that C =
¡
c1,C[2]¢
. Hence, for two time
proﬁles C0 =[ c0,1,c 0,2,c 0,3,...] and C1 =[ c1,1,c 1,2,c 1,3,...],w h e r eck,t refers to






























Finally, a stationarity axiom states that if paths C0 and C1 have the same




























5Alternative (positive) time streams of consumption over an inﬁnite period could not
be compared in the absense of time preference, because they would be unbounded.
12Hence the rankings of the alternative streams (with a common ﬁrst element)
remain unchanged if they are simply moved earlier one period in time.
Having stated the axioms, consider two time paths C1 and C2 such that
c1,t >c 2,t for all t,a n da l lck,t are positive consumption levels (‘all goods are
g o o d ’ ) .I tm u s tt h e r e f o r eb et h ec a s et h a tP(C1) ≥ P(C2). Suppose there are
two other time streams, C3 =( c3,1,C 1) and C4 =( c4,1,C 2) where c3,1 = c4,1.
Hence streams C3 and C4 have a common ﬁrst period’s consumption level,
and thereafter have precisely the same streams, respectively, as C1 and C2.
The stationarity axiom therefore implies that P(C3) ≥ P(C4).
By deﬁnition, the paths C3 and C4, by having a common ﬁrst element,
are less diﬀerent than C1 and C2. S i n c e ,f r o ma b o v e ,e a c hp e r i o dm a t t e r s ,
this implies that:
P(C1 − C2) >P(C3 − C4) (8)
This property implies that the diﬀerence is smaller, the more distant in time
it is: this is referred to as ‘time perspective’; see Koopmans, Diamond and
Williamson (1964).
Next, consider alternative streams such that C1 and C2 diﬀer only in the
ﬁr s tt i m ep e r i o d ,s u c ht h a tc1,1 − c2,1 =1 . Hence the streams C3 and C4
diﬀer only in their second period, by the same amount. Using (8) it can be
seen that:
P (1,0,0,0,0,...) >P(0,1,0,0,0,...) (9)
Hence, with only one unit of consumption available, there is a preference for
having this in the ﬁrst period, rather than having nothing in the ﬁrst period
and waiting to consume the unit in the second period. There is therefore a
preference for bringing the consumption forward from the second to the ﬁrst
period. This result clearly implies pure time preference.
3.2 A Measure of Pure Time Preference
It is necessary to have a measure of the extent of this pure time preference.
Consider for simplicity the two-period case. Time preference can be inter-
preted in a diagram with period 2’s consumption on the vertical axis and
period 1’s consumption on the horizontal axis, using the concept of social
13indiﬀerence curves, along which P is constant. In general, the absolute slope
of the social indiﬀerence curve, the marginal rate of substitution of period










Where a social indiﬀerence curve passes through the point where con-
sumption is the same in each period, the curve must be steeper than a
downward sloping 45 degree line, which has an absolute slope of 1.T h i s
is because time preference implies that the social planner is prepared to give
up one unit in the second period in order to get less than one extra unit in





Ap r e c i s em e a s u r eo fp u r et i m ep r e f e r e n c ec a nb eb a s e do nt h ee x t e n tt o
which the absolute slope of the social indiﬀerence curve at c1 = c2 exceeds 1,
as follows. Suppose the evaluation function P is additively separable, so that
P (c1,c 2)=P1 (c1)+P2 (c2). In the case where c1 = c2 = c and consumption
is the same in both periods, time preference implies that P1 (c) >P 2 (c).
Writing P1 (c)=U (c),i tm u s tb ep o s s i b l et ow r i t eP (c,c)=U (c)+γU (c),





To express the fact that γ<1,w r i t e1
γ =1+ρ. Clearly ρ reﬂects the
extent to which the social indiﬀerence curve at c1 = c2 = c is steeper than
45 degrees. Hence ρ m e a s u r e st h er a t eo fp u r et i m ep r e f e r e n c eo ft h es o c i a l
planner, and γ =1 /(1 + ρ).
In general it can be shown that if P(C0) >P (C1), for two streams C0















14where, as above, U (ct) represents an evaluation function deﬁned over a single
period, t, in contrast with the multi-period P. Hence, the ranking according









The evaluation function W (C) has the same form as the welfare function in
(1) above. The diﬀerence is that in the latter case, pure time preference is
simply assumed to be a feature of the social planner, who uses the cardinal
weighting function U (c) in each period: it is necessarily cardinal because
the values are added in (14). However, following Koopman’s axiomatic ap-
proach, time preference is seen to be implied by a set of basic axioms, where
evaluation of a time stream is based on an ordinal evaluation function, P.
In general, the absolute slope of a social indiﬀerence curve associated with

















4 Choice of Optimal Time Stream
Consider a planner, with value judgements represented by the social welfare
function in (1), who must decide on the optimal consumption and saving
path of the economy. The welfare function is maximised subject to an in-







ct = Y (16)
where Y represents a measure of the present value of resources available for
consumption over the period, and r is the rate of interest in a perfect capital
market. The Lagrangean for this problem is:
































Convenient analytical results can be obtained where U takes the isoelastic
form U (c)=c1−ε






















ct − 1, taking logarithms and using the approximation




(r − ρ) (21)
This expression is known as the Euler equation for optimal consumption: it
describes the optimal time path of consumption. In this simple problem,
if the various rates are constant, consumption either grows or declines at a
constant rate, depending on the value of r−ρ. If the pure time preference rate
is equal to the market rate of interest, consumption smoothing is implied,
with gt =0 .
Rearrangement of (21) gives:
r = ρ + εgt (22)
so that at the optimal position the equates the market rate of interest with
ρ + εgt. It may therefore be said that along the optimal path, the planner
equates the marginal return from saving, represented by the market rate of
interest, r, with the marginal cost of saving, represented by ρ + εgt.
The above analysis of optimal consumption is often used in macroeco-
nomic models of optimal saving; see, for example, Blanchard and Fischer
(1989) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). In such models macroeconomic
16behaviour is assumed to be captured by the behaviour of a single individ-
ual described as a ‘representative agent’, rather than a social planner as
discussed here. There is therefore no consideration of aggregation require-
ments. In some growth models, the representative individual is assumed to
be inﬁnitely lived. The introduction of population growth and other com-
plications can produce a diﬀerent Euler equation from that given in (21), as
discussed in section 6 below.
5 The Social Time Preference Rate
P r e v i o u ss e c t i o n sh a v es h o w nt h a tt h ep u r et i m ep r e f e r e n c er a t e ,ρ,o fah y -
pothetical judge is used in the context of a social welfare function to discount
the weighted values U (ct) for each period. However, in cost-beneﬁt analyses
it is common to compare present values of time streams of money values
of consumption, using a ‘consumption discount rate’, rather than the ‘utility
discount rate’, ρ. Following (22), the consumption discount rate, δ,i sd e ﬁned
as:
δ = ρ + εgt (23)
This rate, δ, is more commonly referred to as the ‘social time preference
rate’.6 In the context of cost-beneﬁt analyses where money values of an
exogenous consumption stream are evaluated, the social time preference rate,
δ, does not need to be set equal to the market rate of interest.7 The terms ρ
and ε reﬂect the value judgements of the independent judge, and in carrying
out cost-beneﬁt analyses these values have not surprisingly been the focus
of much attention. Equation (23) is the fundamental equation that takes a
6Pearce and Ulph (1998) actually refer to the pure time preference rate simply as the
‘ r a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e( t h er a t ea tw h i c hutility is discounted’, and decompose it into a
‘pure rate’ and a term reﬂecting the rate of growth of life chances. They refer to δ = ρ+εg
as the ‘consumption rate of interest’.
7This contrasts with determination of the optimal growth path, as in the previous
section, where δ must be equal to the market rate of interest, r . The latter is determined
by, for example, the marginal product of capital — depending on the precise nature of the
growth model considered.
17central role when discussing social time preference rates to be used in cost-
beneﬁt analysis. However, there is a serious problem with such an approach,
which does not seem to be well-understood in the literature. This problem
can be seen from the following comparisons: for further details, see Creedy
(2007).
The approach, focusing on the primary role of the social time preference
rate, as in (23), is thus to produce a ‘social evaluation’ of the time path, ct











It is usually taken for granted that this welfare function gives the same rank-
i n go fp r o j e c t sa sd o e st h ef u n c t i o ni n( 1 ) .
In comparing the two forms of evaluation, it is convenient to begin with
the most favourable case, that is where consumption does in fact grow at the
constant proportional rate, g. Hence ct = c1 (1 + g)
t−1 , for t =1 ,...,T,a n d











































Furthermore, using the approximation (1 + ρ)(1+g)























18This ﬁnal results demonstrates that it is not correct to believe that W∗,
obtained by discounting money values of consumption at the social time
preference rate, coincides with W, obtained by discounting U (ct) at the pure
time preference rate ρ. For given ε, W∗ automatically gives the same ranking
as W only if ε<1 and two consumption streams, with diﬀerent growth rates,
have the same initial value of consumption. Otherwise, inconsistencies can
arise.
For example, Figure 10 shows the present value of the time streams of
consumption shown in Figure 7, for ε =0 .6,u s i n gW∗,t h a ti sw i t hm o n e y
values discounted using the rate ρ+εg and with g set equal to the trend rate
of growth. It can be seen that proﬁle A dominates for all values of ρ whereas,
using the same value of ε =0 .6, comparisons of W depend signiﬁcantly on
the value of ρ used, as illustrated in Figure 9 above.
A: epsilon = 0.6















A: epsilon = 0.6















Figure 10: Comparisons Using the Social Time Preference Rate
H e n c ei ti sa d v i s a b l et ou s et h eb a s i cf o r mo fw e l f a r ef u n c t i o ni n( 1 ) ,w i t h
an explicit form for U (ct), rather than discounting the stream ct using the
rate ρ + εg.
196 The Choice of Unit of Analysis
The previous discussion has assumed that there are no relevant non-income
diﬀerences between individuals and that population size is constant. Suppose
instead that the number of individuals at time t is Nt and that individuals
of age i have an equivalent adult size of si, for example because they may
have special age-related needs. The equivalent size of the population at t is
Pt =
P
i siNi,t and the average equivalent size is st = Pt/ /Nt. The question
then arises as to the variable, or ‘welfare metric’ to enter the social welfare
function. One approach is to write U, the weighting function, as a function
of the ratio of average consumption to average equivalent size, ct/st = Ct/Pt,
where Ct denotes aggregate consumption in period t. It should be recognised
that this is not equal to average consumption per equivalent person, the
average value of c/s in the population at year t.8
Given a distinction between indivduals and equivalent persons, a further
decision must be made about the unit of anlysis in a welfare function. This
decision again involves value judgements. The question of choice of units
has been considered in the literature on inequality measurement, but has re-
ceived little attention in multi-period contexts; for an exception, see Creedy
and Guest (2006).9 Statements about comparisons between households, in
the context of inequality, can easily be converted to statements about com-
parisons between time periods.
One approach to deﬁning a unit of analysis is to use the ‘adult equivalent
person’. In the multiperiod context, there are Pt adult equivalent persons at












8The two terms are equal either if ci,t/si,t is constant for all i,o ri fsi,t and ci,t are
uncorrelated.
9Major contributions in the context of inequality include Shorrocks (2004), Decoster
and Ooghe (2002), Glewwe (1991) and Ebert (1997). The use of diﬀerent units can lead
to opposite conclusions about the eﬀects on inequality of a tax policy change. Examples
of such conﬂicts using tax microsimulation models are given by Decoster and Ooge (2002)
and Creedy and Scutella (2004).




(r − ρ)+( pt − nt) (31)
where gt,p t and nt are respectively the proportional rates of change of Ct,
Pt and Nt. In this way, the ‘income’ concept and the unit of analysis are
treated consistently, ensuring that each individual’s contribution depends on
the demographic structure of the time period to which they belong. An
alternative approach is to treat the individual as the basic unit of analysis.


















{r − ρ +( ε − 1)(pt − nt)} (33)
so that although the diﬀerence between the social welfare functions (30) and
(32) concerns only the choice of weghts in each period, that is a choice be-
tween Pt or Nt, the resulting optimal consumption paths can diﬀer substan-
tially. This is because the choice between individuals and adult equivalents
as the basic unit of analysis can in principle lead to diﬀerent conclusions
about the eﬀects of transferring consumption between time periods, which
has implications for the path of optimal consumption.
7 Conclusions
This paper has provided an introduction to the evaluation of alternative time
streams of consumption using the concept of time preference. The potential
sensitivity of comparisons, especially to the choice of time preference rate
and elasticity of marginal valuation, was stressed. The nature of time pref-
erence, based on an axiomatic approach, was examined. The analysis of
individual optimisation over time then led to the concept of the social time
preference rate, and a diﬃculty with using this rate was highlighted. Finally,
complications introduced by non-income diﬀerences between individuals were
21examined. Ultimately, evaluations cannot avoid value judgments, so the role
of the economist is to examine the implications of adopting alternative value
judgements. As argued by Varian (2006), ‘Exploring the implications of al-
ternative assumptions is likely to lead to better policy than making a single
blanket recommendation. At least at this stage of our understanding, explo-
ration beats exhortation’.
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